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In November 1993, the U.S. Congress
voted to pass the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) after
months of heated debate about its likely
impact on our economy. As a result of
the intense focus on this issue, the public
has benefited from a greater appreciation
of the increased interdependence of the
Mexican and U.S. economies. However,
both the public debate and detailed
analysis of the post-NAFTA economic
environment have understated the
importance of capital flows from the
United States into Mexico.
Most observers agree that Mexico's trade
deficit with our nation implies Mexican
borrowing. Unfortunately, predictions of
the post-NAFTA environment often
emphasize the effects of the removal of
trade barriers on trade, employment, and
output and assume that the necessary
borrowing will somehow materialize.
Few studies point out that although
changes in the trade balance may be sup-
ported by capital flows, it is also possible
that fluctuations in capital flows and the
Mexican policy response to such flows
could alter the trade balance and thus
affect output and employment.
This Economic Commentary details the
role of capital flows from the United
States to Mexico for the post-NAFTA
period. First, I contrast recent data on the
bilateral exports and imports of goods
and services with data on capital move-
ments. Mexico is an important exception
to the list of countries with which our
nation runs a trade deficit: Overall, we
borrow from most of the rest of the
world. Second, I discuss evidence
regarding the causation of capital flows
and the implications for the Mexican
economy. A key conclusion is that fac-
tors external to Mexico have important
influences on capital movements.
Finally, I discuss some of the possible
Mexican policy responses to capital
flows and how they might affect trade
flows between the two nations. A key
decision of the Mexican central bank
involves the use of partially sterilized
intervention to respond to shifts in capi-
tal flows that are caused by outside de-
velopments.
1 It appears that forecasts of
the post-NAFTA trade flows between
Mexico and the United States could eas-
ily be confounded by a combination of
developments in international capital
markets and Mexican policy decisions.
• Accounting for Recent
U.S.-Mexico Trade Flows
Most analyses of U.S.-Mexico trade
have focused on merchandise trade
(such as agricultural products and
machinery), which is clearly much more
important to Mexico than to our nation.
Since January 1993, the United States
has enjoyed merchandise trade surpluses
averaging $232 million per month (see
figure I).
2 Although Mexico is a strik-
ingly large exception to the list of coun-
tries with which we run a merchandise
Predictions of the effects of removing
barriers on trade, employment, and
output between Mexico and the
United States were abundant follow-
ing passage of the North American
Free Trade Agreement in late 1993.
Missing from much of the dialogue,
however, was emphasis on the impor-
tance of capital flows from the United
States into Mexico. The Mexican cen-
tral bank's response to fluctuations in
these capital flows could alter the
trade balance, with important impli-
cations for output and employment.trade deficit, exports to Mexico account-
ed for only 6 percent of total U.S. ex-
ports in 1993:IVQ and amounted to only
1 percent of U.S. gross domestic product
(GDP).
3 Mexico's trade dependence on
us is far greater: Shipments to the United
States were 78 percent of its total exports
and 10 percent of its GDP, while imports
from the United States were 69 percent
of its total imports.
4
A less recognized fact is that capital
flows from the United States into Mexico
are significant. Net capital flows are
more closely related to the balance on
current account (BCA, as shown in fig-
ure 2) between the two countries than to
the merchandise trade balance. The BCA
is a more comprehensive measure of
trade, although it is available less fre-
quently.
5 The U.S. BCA with Mexico
became positive in 1991, increased to $5
billion in 1992, then dropped sharply in
1993. As with the merchandise trade bal-
ance, the Mexican-U.S. BCA surplus
stands in contrast to the overall U.S.
BCA deficit.
The connection between the U.S.-
Mexican BCA and bilateral capital
flows is indirect, however. Although the
Mexican BCA deficit with the United
States must be associated with someone
acquiring $5 billion of Mexican assets
(a capital inflow into Mexico), the
United States is not necessarily the
acquirer. More direct evidence is shown
in the annual accounting of net flows of
private assets from the United States to
Mexico (figure 3). In 1993, net U.S. pri-
vate assets in Mexico increased by
almost $14 billion. Like the BCA, this
bilateral statistic stands in contrast with
the relation of the United States to the
world as a whole. While capital moves
from the United States to Mexico, it
moves from the world as a whole into
the United States.
U.S. capital flows into Mexico are thus
not directly related to the fact that the
United States runs a BCA surplus with
Mexico. However, even if we look at
Mexico's BCA deficit and capital
accounts with the entire world, we can-
not conclude that capital flows are
caused by the BCA.
CAPITAL FLOWS IN THE WAKE OF NAFTA
Much analysis of the post-NAFTA environment is influenced by economic stud-
ies of NAFTA itself. Although varied in their approaches, such studies generally
pay less attention to capital flows than to trade, output, and employment. They
often either assume that the capital flows required by trade predictions will
somehow materialize, or they predict capital flows based on the experience of
other countries. Moreover, a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) assessment
notes that"... most of the models... assume that the respective capital stocks of
the United States and Mexico would be unaffected by NAFTA" and that they
thus ignore the potential long-term impact of increased capital flows.
a Only
one 1993 study made an explicit prediction of capital flows, and it significantly
underestimated them.
b
Analyses that ignore the long-run impact of capital inflows on the Mexican capi-
tal stock (mainly equipment and factories) probably predict too high a level of in-
terest rates (since the marginal productivity of capital would fall with higher cap-
ital) and too low a level of wages. The larger stock of capital would permit higher
output and income. The short run, however, is harder to predict, and analyses that
assume an eventual increase in the capital stock ignore the short-run interactions
between capital flows and the exchange rate. For example, in the long run, the
Mexican BCA deficit could be smaller, lowering the value of the peso, while in
the short run, in order to facilitate the capital inflows, the peso would be stronger
and the BCA deficit larger. Although a stronger peso will help Mexico's fight
against inflation, the adjustment of the Mexican export sector to trade liberaliza-
tion may be made more difficult.
0
a. See "Estimating the Effects of NAFTA: An Assessment of the Economic Models and Other Empirical
Studies," Congressional Budget Office, June 1993, p. 31. Although the aggregate capital stock is
assumed to be unchanged, a shift between expanding and contracting industries is allowed.
b. This study estimated that net capital flows from all countries into Mexico would average between $3
billion and $9 billion per year for 10 years. Though the 1992 Mexican BCA deficit with the United
States was $5 billion, the IMF estimated the overall Mexican BCA deficit at $22.8 billion. See "A Bud-
getary and Economic Analysis of the North American Free Trade Agreement," Congressional Budget
Office, July 1993. This study concludes that"... the effect of NAFTA on capital flows has not been
analyzed as much as its likely economic significance would appear to justify." (p. 18)
c. See the comments by Robert Z. Lawrence in Nora Lustig, Barry P. Bosworth, and Robert Z.
Lawrence, eds., North American Free Trade: Assessing the Impact, Washington, D.C.: The Brook-
ings Institution, 1992.
It is just as likely that the BCA—and
thus the trade flows—are caused by the
capital flows. As a result, developments
external to Mexico, such as changes in
international capital markets, may ini-
tially affect capital flows and force an
adjustment in the current account. In
fact, the experience of the past few years
confirms that capital flows do not simply
respond to the BCA (see figure 4). The
monthly volume of gross purchases of
long-term securities between the United
States and Mexico has grown much
more sharply than the volume of trade.
6
The jump in volume in 1990 is widely
attributed to an improved investment
climate brought about by financial liber-
alization and income policies enacted in
1988, as well as by the implementation
in 1990 of the Brady Plan for Mexico's
external bank debt.
7 Actual and an-
nounced policy changes undoubtedly
led the financial markets to anticipate
changes in trade flows, but this does not
automatically imply that the trade flows
had to change before capital flowed into
Mexico. A comparison of figures 2 and
4 shows that although the recent swing
of the U.S. BCA with Mexico toward a
surplus has been accompanied by large
volumes of gross capital flows, previous
deficits in the BCA of comparable mag-
nitude did not follow this pattern.
We have some reason to believe that cap-
ital flows can play an independent and
significant role in eventually moving the
current account, rather than vice versa.
8FIGURE 1 U.S. MERCHANDISE TRADE WITH MEXICO
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One reason is that worldwide develop-
ments in capital markets may have
changed either the magnitude of expect-
ed capital flows or the sensitivity of such
flows to changes in interest rates. One
research study finds that international
capital flows have grown faster than
either domestic financial-market activity
or the value of world trade.
9 Some of the
explanations for this conclusion include
less expensive telecommunications and
data processing, the need to finance
larger fiscal and current account deficits,
a desire to hedge against higher volatility
of asset prices, and securitization. Latin
America has been a major destination for
capital flows in the early 1990s. Annual
capital flows to Latin America from all
countries averaged $8 billion during the
late 1980s, but grew to $24 billion in




Capital flows also appear to be influ-
enced by external factors. Although
much economic analysis assumes that
capital flows respond to interest-rate
differentials (so that policies leading to
increased Mexican interest rates should
draw capital into Mexico), there is evi-
dence that this mechanism does a poor
job of explaining capital flows into or
out of the nation. While Mexican short-
term interest rates have been well above
U.S. rates since at least 1988, differen-
tials have narrowed on average since
1990, a period of high volumes of capi-
tal transactions between the two coun-
tries. In a detailed econometric study,
three authors found that in addition to
interest-rate differentials, some external
factors were at work in drawing capital
to Latin America: the U.S. recession,
the decline in U.S. interest rates, and a




• Capital Inflows and
Foreign Exchange Reserves
The role of the central bank has been
largely ignored in discussions of capital
inflows. Central bank decisions on capi-
tal flows affect the official reserve ac-
count, which measures the central bank's
net acquisition of official assets versus
that of other central banks. Capital in-
flows to Mexico thus do not necessarily
translate into greater BCA deficits, as the
Bank of Mexico may choose to absorb
some of the inflow into its reserves—in
effect, determining how much of the cap-
ital inflow is allowed to affect exports
and imports. If the central bank inter-
venes and buys all of the foreign cur-
rency pouring into the country, then the
foreign exchange reserves of the central
bank rise (the official reserve account
changes) and the current account is unaf-
fected. Or, if the central bank chooses not
to intervene, then the capital inflow is
reflected in exports and imports and the
current account moves toward a deficit.
This latter scenario is subject to two dif-
ferent interpretations. Suppose an analyst
notices that Mexico is importing more
than it is exporting (a current account
deficit) and is also borrowing from
abroad. One could conclude that Mexico
is being forced to borrow to finance its
"excess" spending. On the other hand,FIGURE 3 NET FLOW OF U.S. PRIVATE ASSETS TO MEXICO
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one could view the imports as being a
result of capital flowing into the country.
For example, suppose the international
investment community has become opti-
mistic about the future profitability of a
particular Mexican resort and pours
money into Mexico. Completion of the
project would probably require the
importation of equipment and other cap-
ital goods and thus a movement of the
Mexican capital account toward deficit.
By intervening to purchase some of the
foreign currency flowing into the coun-
try, the Bank of Mexico prevents the
capital inflows from being fully
reflected in the current account and thus
reduces spending on imports from the
United States. Another decision con-
fronts the central bank once it has inter-
vened. In buying up the dollars flowing
into the country, the Bank of Mexico
increases the money supply (of pesos)
and eventually stokes inflation. It could
sterilize the rise in the money supply by
selling government securities to remove
the pesos from circulation. But although
the inflationary impact of more money
would then be neutralized, higher inter-
est rates would result from having
increased government borrowing. Cen-
tral bank decisions on intervention in
response to capital inflows and then on
sterilization of such intervention thus
affect the current account, inflation, and
interest rates.
• How Have the Capital
Flows Been Used?
It may not matter much that analysts
have often ignored capital flows, de-
pending on how such flows have been
used. Ideally, in the case of an economy
as dependent on international trade as is
Mexico, capital inflows would be largely
channeled into investments to boost
productivity and to lower prices on ex-
ports, thus improving the BCA, national
economic output, and employment.
There is only mixed evidence that this
has occurred, however. While the vol-
ume of capital goods imports has risen
steadily since well before the surge in
capital flows, there has been no clear
increase in the share of imports ac-
counted for by capital goods. The capi-
tal flows have also apparently not led to
increased domestic expenditures on
capital goods, because the share of gross
fixed capital formation to GDP has not
risen appreciably since before the 1990
surge in capital flows.
12 Thus, there is
only weak evidence that the capital
inflows have been used mainly to invest
in productivity enhancement.
The Bank of Mexico has played an
active role in response to capital inflows,
as shown in figure 5. The Mexican capi-
tal account has trended higher since
1990 and has been associated with rec-
ord levels of foreign exchange reserves.
This indicates that the central bank has
been intervening heavily to prevent capi-
tal inflows from being fully reflected in
a deterioration in the current account.FIGURE 5 MEXICO'S CAPITAL ACCOUNT
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• How a Capital Outflow Could
Alter the Post-NAFTA Economy
Despite all of the economic reform
efforts in Mexico, it is still possible that
higher U.S. interest rates, combined with
greater sensitivity of capital flows to
changes in interest rates, could lead to
capital outflows from Mexico. Without
any intervention from the central bank,
this would lead to an improvement in
Mexico's BCA, which implies fewer net
imports from the United States and a
negative impact on U.S. employment. In
this situation, however, the Bank of
Mexico might feel compelled to inter-
vene to prevent the sale of Mexican
assets from unduly depressing the value
of the peso. The foreign exchange
reserves would be drawn upon to buy
pesos, leading to a contraction of the
Mexican money supply, again with neg-
ative impacts on the Mexican economy
and thus on net imports from the United
States. If the Bank of Mexico fully ster-
ilized its intervention in the exchange
markets by buying Mexican securities,
the money supply would not fall, but the
rates on securities would drop, poten-
tially exacerbating the outflow and mak-
ing it even more inevitable that Mexico's
net imports from the United States
would decline.
• Conclusion
Analyses of the post-NAFTA economic
scene generally focus on trade, employ-
ment, and output, with little attention
paid to capital flows, which may be
important influences in the short run.
Because recent capital flows from the
United States to Mexico have been
larger than would have been expected,
more attention needs to be focused on
the important roles played by interna-
tional financial markets and by the
Mexican central bank in determining
the size of capital flows and their effects
on the Mexican economy, and thus on
net imports from the United States.
The short-term impact of capital flows
has been somewhat mixed. While the
capital inflows have been allowed to
partially feed through to the BCA, im-
plying increased net imports from the
United States, it is not clear that the
resultant inflows have been used mainly
to invest in capital goods that would lead
to improved Mexican productivity. The
foreign exchange reserves of the Mexi-
can central bank are at high levels as a
result of intervention in response to the
capital inflows. However, it is always
possible that higher U.S. interest rates,
combined with an increased sensitivity
of capital flows to changes in interest
rates, would lead to a capital outflow
from Mexico. In that case, Mexico's net
imports from the United States would
drop off through mechanisms seldom
explicitly considered in the discussion of
NAFTA and its aftermath.
• Footnotes
1. Partially sterilized intervention refers to
central bank transactions in foreign curren-
cies whose impact is partly felt on the money
supply.
2. This figure is measured on a customs
value basis (c.v.b.—the value of imports
excluding shipping costs) and is equivalent to
$2.78 billion per year. On a cost, insurance,
and freight (c.i.f.) basis, the surplus is $164
million per month, or $1.96 billion per year.
3. The ratio of U.S. exports to Mexico as a
percentage of total U.S. exports is calculated
using the International Monetary Fund's
(IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics for
1993:IVQ. U.S. exports as a percentage of
U.S. GDP is calculated from the IMF's Inter-
national Financial Statistics (IFS). The prod-
uct of the two ratios yields an estimate of the
ratio between U.S. exports to Mexico and
U.S. GDP.
4. See footnote 3. The sources and method
of calculating the ratio between Mexican
exports to the United States and Mexican
GDP are the same as for calculating the ratio
between U.S. exports to Mexico and U.S.
GDP. Unfortunately, however, the most
recent IFS data that can be used to calculate
the ratio between Mexican exports and Mexi-
can GDP are for 1992.
5. The BCA measures the trade in goods and
services, taking into account all unilateral
transfers, including private remittances and
government transfers. It thus includes all
entries other than asset transactions.6. The U.S. Treasury Department's monthly
data are probably the most frequently avail-
able for capital flows. These data are filed by
commercial banks and other financial institu-
tions, both U.S. and foreign. These are gross
data, referring to the same security possibly
being involved in more than one transaction
and thus possibly being counted more than
once. These data do not correspond to the net
movement of funds implied by the BCA. The
main exclusions from the Treasury data are
intercompany capital transactions between
the United States and foreign offices of the
same company and capital transactions of the
U.S. government.
7. See, for example, OECD Economic Sur-
veys: Mexico 1991/1992, Paris: Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, 1992, pp. 26-36.
8. Although most studies of NAFTA do not
predict capital flows, they implicitly assume
that capital flows are sufficient for savings to
equal investment. See box on page 2.
9. See Morris Goldstein and Michael Mussa,
"The Integration of World Capital Markets,"
International Monetary Fund, paper prepared
for the Conference on "Changing Capital
Markets: Implications for Monetary Policy,"
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, August 1993, p. 39.
10. Ibid.
11. See Guillermo A. Calvo, Leonardo Lei-
derman, and Carmen M. Reinhart, "Capital
Inflows and Real Exchange Rate Apprecia-
tion in Latin America," IMF Staff Papers,
vol. 40, no. 1 (March 1993), pp. 108-51. In
practice, there may be a variety of obstacles,
such as regulations or taxes, that prevent
investors from moving funds to take advan-
tage of differences in interest rates.
12. IFS data show that for Mexico, this
ratio rose from an average of 0.186 in
1987-89 to only 0.195 in 1990-92. On the
other hand, for Chile, the country to which
Mexico's reform effort is most often com-
pared, the ratio rose from 0.210 to 0.233
over the same two periods. By way of con-
trast, the Bank of Mexico reports that the
ratio of private investment to GDP rose
from 0.167 to 0.198. See The Mexican
Economy 1994, Mexico City: Banco de
Mexico, 1994, p. 214.
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